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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. 78 2a 3 (k) (as amended 1992). This action 
originated in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, involving a probate matter-
It was originally appealed to the Supreme Court of the State 
of Utah, which has transferred it to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The controlling statute in this case is Utah Code Ann. 
30-1-4.5 (1953 as amended). This statute provides for 
determining the validity of marriage not solemnized. The 
statute requires action to be brought, in this case, within 
one year after the termination of the marriage relationship 
to determine the validity of the marriage. There ar& five 
separate elements which must be established by a Court or 
administrative order establishing that the marriage existed 
and arouse out of a contract between two consenting parties. 
Each point must be manifested in any form and may be proved 
under the same general rules of evidence as facts in other 
cases. 
1. The statute requires the parties be capable of 
giving consent. Standard of Review is a question of law and 
is reviewed for correctness. Kimbal1 vs. Campbel1, 699 P.2d 
714, (Utah, 1985). 
2. The parties must have been legally capable of 
entering a solemnized marriage under the provisions of this 
chapter (Title 30). Standard of Review is a question of law 
and is reviewed for correctness. Kimbal1, supra. 
3. The parties must have cohabitated. Standard of 
Review is a question of law and is reviewed for correctness. 
Kimball.9 supra, 
4. The parties must have mutually assumed marital 
rights, duties, and obligations. Standard of Review is a 
question of law and is reviewed for correctness. Kimbal1. 
supra.* 
5. The parties must have held themselves out as and 
have acquired a uniform and general rep\-vtat.ion as husband and 
wife. Standard of Review is a question of law and is 
reviewed for correctness. Kimbal1 « supra. 
6. The Appellant (Orin Sorensen) has greatly misstated 
certain facts in his brief concerning the relationship 
between Martin Van Nood and Susan Gustaveson, leading to an 
incorrect interpretation of the statute. Standard of Review 
is a question of law and is reviewed for correctness. 
Kimbal1 « supra. 
7. Appellant Sorensen has inputed Legislative intent to 
the interpretation of Utah Code Ann. 30-1-4.5 (1953 as 
amended) which does not exist. 
8. Appellee Van Nood should be awarded costs and 
attorney fees as provided by Utah Rules App. P. 33(a) as the 
Appellant Sorensen has not cited any Legislative intent or 
statutory authority to support his argument. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
1. Utah Code Ann. 30-1-4.5 (1953 as amended) 
See addendum 1 
2. Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33 (a) 
See addendum 2 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal, steming from a trial to determine 
that Mr. Martin Van Nood and Ms. Susan Gustaveson had entered 
into a marriage contract and become common law husband and 
wife prior to the death of Susan on October 19, 1992. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Ms. Susan R. Gustaveson died on October 19, 1992, 
apparently intestate. Appellant, Orin Thomas Sorensen, 
brother of the decedent filed a petition to determine that 
the decedent died intestate and to have himself appointed the 
personal representative of her estate. Mr. Van Nood and 
Melvin Gustaveson filed a counter—petition objecting to the 
petition of the Appellant and requesting that Mr. Van Nood be 
appointed the personal representative of the decedent, as the 
person having priority as the decedent's husband. 
The matter came before the Probate Judge, Richard H. 
Moffat, and the matter was transferred to the trial calendar, 
and Judge Richard H. Moffat was assigned to the case. 
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DISPOSITION OF THE TRIAL COURT 
The matter came on for trial on the 25th day of March, 
1993. After a four hour trial the Court held that the 
decedent (Susan Gustaveson) and Martin Van Nood had entered 
into a marital contract under the provisions of Utah Cod Ann. 
30-1-4.5 (1953 as amended) and that a valid marriage existed 
between the two parties. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Susan R. Gustaveson died October 19, 1992, apparently 
intestate. Her sole surviving blood relative was the 
Appellant, Orin Thomas Sorensen, her brother. 
Ms. Gustaveson had been divorced in 1982; and in 19S8 
entered into a marital relationship with Martin Van Nood, 
with whom she lived from June, 1988 until her death in 
October, 1992. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The controlling statute in this case is Utah Code Ann. 
30-1-4.5 (1953 as amended). Appellee Martin Van Nood's 
arguments are addressed to each of the five criteria of the 
statute, required to be proven to establish that a marriage 
existed between the Appellee Van Nood and Ms. Gustaveson. 
The statute requires that the parties were: 
1. Capable of giving consent to a marriage contract. 
2. Legally capable of entering into a solemnized 
marriage under Utah Code Ann. Title 30 (1953 as amended). 
3. Cohabitated. 
4. Mutually assumed marital rights, duties and 
obligations. 
5. Held themselves out and acquired a uniform and 
general reputation as husband and wife. 
Appellee Van Nood further argues that the lower Court 
correctly concluded from the facts and evidence aduced at 
trail that Mr. Van Nood and Ms. Gustaveson were husband and 
wife. 
The Legislature provided in the statute that the above 
criteria shall be established by Court or Administrative 
order by finding evidence of a marriage manifested in any 
form and proved under the same general rules of evidence as 
facts in other cases. 
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The Appellee Martin Van Nood has proved all of the 
elements of the statute by a preponderance of evidence. That 
the controlling facts are by and large undisputed by 
Appellant Sorensen; and that the findings of fact are 
supported by the evidence and support the conclusion of the 
trial judge that a marriage existed between Martin Van Nood 
and Susan Gustaveson at the date of her death. 
The Appellant Sorensen has made some misstatements of 
evidence in concluding the relationship of Mr. Van Nood and 
Ms. Gustaveson was "rocky". This is not the case. He has 
also inferred that the Legislature mandated the finding of 
certain facts concerning property ownership necessary to 
establish a marriage under the common law statute. This is 
without merit and is addressed in ARGUMENTS SIX and SEVEN of 
Appellee Van Nood's brief. 
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ARGUMENT ONE 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE CRITERIA 
OF UTAH CODE ANN. 30-1-4.5 (1953 
AS AMENDED) THAT THE APPELLEE AND 
THE DECEDENT WERE CAPABLE OF GIVING 
CONSENT TO A MARRIAGE CONTRACT. 
The Appellant Sorensen does not dispute the fact that 
Mr. Van Nood and Ms. Gustaveson were capable of giving 
consent to a marriage contract. The testimony clearly shows 
the parties were adults. When they first met, Martin was 39 
and Susan was 32 years of age. They were both gainfully 
employed at responsible jobs (Transcript pages 37 and 131). 
They maintained bank accounts (Transcript page 44), filed tax 
returns (Transcript page 65), owned real and personal 
property (Transcript page 45), and had previously entered 
into marriages and divorces with other persons. All these 
facts show evidence of ability to enter into a marriage 
contract. 
There is no evidence that they were not capable of 
entering into such a contract. 
The Court correctly applied these facts in reaching its 
conclusion that the parties had entered into a marriage 
contract. 
ARGUMENT TWO 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE CRITERIA OF 
UTAH CODE ANN. 30-1-4.5 (1953 AS AMENDED) 
THAT THE APPELLEE AND THE DECEDENT WERE 
LEGALLY CAPABLE OF ENTERING A SOLEMNIZED 
MARRIAGE UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE 
ANN. TITLE 30 (1953 AS AMENDED) 
Appellant Sorensen does not dispute the fact that Mr. 
Van Nood and Ms. Gustaveson were legally capable of entering 
into a solemnized marriage under the provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. Title 30 sets forth the prohibitions to a marriage in 
Utah, particularly Utah Code Ann. 30-1-2 (1953 as amended). 
None apply to this case. 
The prohibitions ares 
1. If a party is afflicted with immune deficiency 
syndrome, syphilis, or gonorrhea that is communicable or that 
may become communicable. 
There is no evidence that either Martin Van Nood nor 
Susan Gustaveson had any of these diseases. 
2. Where there is a husband or wife living, from whom 
the person marrying has not been divorced. 
Both Susan and Martin have living former spouses 
(Transcript pages 10 and 37). Both were divorced prior to 
meeting each other (Transcript pages 37-8). Both had been 
granted valid final Decrees of Divorce from Utah Courts 
(Exhibits D-l and D-2). 
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3. When the male or female is under 18 years of age 
unless consent is obtained as provided in Section 30-1-9. 
It is uncontroverted that both Martin and Susan were 
over 18 years of age at the time they entered into their 
marriage contract. 
4. When the male or female is under 14 years of age. 
It is undisputed that both Martin and Susan were over 18 
years of age at the time they entered into their marriage 
contract. 
5. Between a divorced person and any person other than 
the one from whom the divorce was secured until the divorce 
decree becomes absolute, and, if an appeal is taken, until 
after the affirmation of the decree. 
It is undisputed that both Martin Van Nood and Susan 
Gustaveson had received final Decrees of Divorce prior 
to their entering into their marriage relationship. 
(Exhibits D-l and D-2) 
The Court correctly applied these facts in reaching its 
conclusion that the parties had entered into a marriage 
contract. 
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ARGUMENT THREE 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE CRITERIA 
OF UTAH CODE ANN. 30-1-4.5 (1953 
AS AMENDED) THAT APPELLEE AND THE 
DECEDENT COHABITATED 
Appellant Sorensen does not dispute the fact that Mr. 
Van Nood and Ms. Gustaveson cohabitated. Many and varied are 
the witnesses that corroborated this fact of the case. 
Karen Gal legos was questioned about this on page 95 of 
the Transcript. 
Q: And were you aware when they became—started 
living together? 
As Yes. I was. 
Another witness, Mr. Harley Sells, when asked if he was 
aware that the parties were living together (Transcript page 
117) responds: "Yes, I was". 
On page 125 of the Transcript, Witness Jet Kensington 
testifies to this point. 
Q: Do you—do you know of your own knowledge that he 
did move in with her? 
A: Oh, absolutely, yes. 
There were several more people at the trial that covered 
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the cohabitation matter in their testimony. However, in an 
effort toward brevity only one more will be mentioned here. 
A long time acquaintance of Mr. Van Nood and a co-worker 
of Ms. Gustaveson's responds simply when asked the questions 
(Transcript page 132). 
Q: Did you become aware that they were living together? 
As I did. 
Other testimony verified that as part of their 
cohabitation, Martin and Susan engaged in a life together 
including sexual activity (Transcript page 44). They shared 
the same bedroom at home as testified to by Julia Tso who 
lived with Martin and Susan for several years. (Transcript 
page 141-2). 
The Court correctly applied these facts in reaching its 
conclusion that the parties had entered into a marriage 
contract. 
ARGUMENT FOUR 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE CRITERIA 
OF UTAH CODE ANN. 30-1-4.5 (1953 
AS AMENDED) THAT THE APPELLEE AND 
THE DECEDENT MUTUALLY ASSUMED MARITAL 
RIGHTS, DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS 
A. MUTUAL ASSUMPTION OF MARITAL RIGHTS: 
Ms. Gustaveson and Mr. Van Nood assumed the 
following marital rights which Appellant Sorensen does not 
dispute: 
1. The parties lived together for nearly four and one-
half years. (Transcript pages 41-2). 
2. The parties maintained a home for themselves and 
Martin's minor daughter for two years. (Transcript pages 140-
1). They established a home for themselves first in a house 
owned by Martin and then in a condominium owned by Susan for 
another two and one-half years. (Transcript page 42). 
3. They cooked, cleaned, gardened, socialized and 
travelled as a married couple. (Transcript page 42). 
4. They attended family gatherings together; birthdays, 
anniversaries, weddings, graduations, the birth of their 
grandchild, all as husband and wife. (Transcript page 141). 
5. They purchased presents for family and friends 
together as husband and wife. (Transcript page 96). 
6. They owned property individually as is a married 
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couple's right under Utah Code Ann. 30-2-1 (1953 as amended) 
7. The received wages for their personal labor and kept 
separate bank accounts which is a marital right under Utah 
Code Ann. 30-2-4 (1953 as amended). 
8. They shared in family expenses. 
9. They shared a sex life together. 
10. They used each other's surnames on occasion but 
normally went by their prior names as is a right under the 
law. 
When Susan Gustaveson's employer was on the stand 
(Transcript pages 132-3) and the subject of mutual marital 
rights, duties and obligations came up, this is a portion of 
what was said: 
Q: And do you know of your own knowledge whether Susan 
Gustaveson had any interest in a pension plan? 
As She did. 
Q: And do you know of your own knowledge who the 
beneficiary of that pension plan was? 
A: It was Marty. 
During the cross examination of Karen Gallegos, she was 
asked, on page 109 of the Transcript, about this subject. 
Q: (Walsh) Do you know if she and Marty ever mutually 
assumed any marital debts, duties and obligations? 
A: That says marital rights. 
Q: Okay. 
A: So I would say yes. 
This subject can take on many meanings to different 
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people as there seems to be no pre-determined set of behavior 
patterns that will insure that a couple are indeed assuming 
marital rights, duties and obligations. 
Susan Gustaveson's former father-in-law tends to see 
these as domestic functions in the running of a household. 
His testimony on this segment of the statute covers this 
aspect. (Transcript page 148). 
Q: Did it appear to be a functional home? 
A: Oh, yes. 
Q: And were they the type of tasks that you'd expect a 
husband and wife to be performing? 
A: Yes. 
On the other hand when Julia Tso testified, she covered 
everything from the parties sex lives to Christmas 
activities. (Transcript pages 141-2). 
Q: Did she and you father share the same bedroom? 
As Yes, they did. 
Q: Did they share the household responsibilities? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Did you exchange birthday and Christmas presents 
with Susan? 
A: Yes, I did. 
G: And did she exchange them as your as what? 
A: As my mother. 
-16-
B. MUTUAL ASSUMPTION OF MARITAL DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS: 
1. They provided for their mutual living expenses in 
maintaining several homes throughout the course of their 
marital relationship, providing for mutual food, shelter, 
clothing, entertainment, etc. (Transcript pages 44-5). 
2. They jointly cared for Mr. Van Nood's minor child 
for over two years. (Transcript page 42,57,140-1). 
3. They attended family and work related social events 
together as husband and wife. (Transcript pages 58, 96, 
146) . 
4. They corresponded and recieved mail as husband and 
wife. (Transcript page 55). 
5. The parties purchased presents for each other and 
for family members and friends as husband and wife. 
(Transcript page 96). 
6. Susan travelled to be with Martin three or four 
times per week during their marriage relationship when his 
work took him away from their home for six weeks. 
The Court correctly applied these facts in reaching its 
conclusion that the parties had entered into a marriage 
contract. 
ARGUMENT FIVE 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE CRITERIA 
OF UTAH CODE ANN. 30-1-4.5 (1953 AS 
AMENDED) THAT THE APPELLEE AND THE 
DECEDENT HELD THEMSELVES OUT AND 
ACQUIRED A UNIFORM AND GENERAL 
REPUTATION AS HUSBAND AND WIFE 
The witnesses for Martin Van Nood were a diverse group 
of people who knew Martin and Susan very well. They included 
Mr. Van Nood's business partner? Ms. Gustaveson's employer; 
a neighbor of Martin and Susan's; the former husband of 
Susan; the former father—in-law of Susan; Susan's closest 
friend; Martin's daughter, as well as Martin himself. 
EACH TESTIFIED THAT THE PARTIES HELD THEMSELVES OUT AND 
ACQUIRED A UNIFORM AND GENERAL REPUTATION AS HUSBAND AND 
WIFE. 
Witness Van Nood testifies on page 58 of the Transcript, 
when he is asked if he held himself out as the husband of 
Susan. 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: And did she hold herself out to be your wife? 
A: Yeah. 
Karen Gal legos was a very close friend to Ms. Gustaveson 
and knew how she felt in this matter. She testifies 
concerning how parties held themselves. (Transcript pages 96) 
Q: Did—did it appear to you that—did they hold 
-18-
themselves out to you as husband and wife? 
A: Yes. 
Qs Did she ever state to you that she felt married to 
Martin? 
Mr. Sells was associated with Martin Van Nood through 
business. He observed the relationship between Susan and 
Martin over the course of six years. He felt that the couple 
definitely held themselves out as husband and wife. 
(Transcript pages 118-21). 
Qs Did Mr. Van Nood and Ms. Gustaveson hold themselves 
out to you to be husband and wife? 
A: Yes. Basically, yes. 
Q: And when they came to your home, did they hold 
themselves out to be husband and wife? 
A: Yes. 
Later on in his testimony during cross examination he 
expounds. 
Qs (Walsh) What does it mean then when you answer the 
question in the affirmative that they held themselves 
out as husband and wife? What did they do to make you 
believe that they were husband and wife? 
A: They did everything a husband and wife would do 
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except they didn't have a marriage certificate as far 
as I know. 
When asked directly, Jet Kensington, a neighbor to 
Susan and Martin affirms their status. (Transcript pages 
125-6). 
Q: And did they, while you knew them and while they 
were living as your neighbors, hold themselves out to 
be husband and wife? 
A: Wei 1, yes. 
Mr. Melvin Gustaveson obviously knew Susan well due to 
their having developed a father-daughter relationship from 
the late 1970's. Further he was privy to witnessing the 
parties behavior not only at family gatherings and with 
friends but also when they traveled together. (Transcript 
pages 147,51). 
Q: And when you were travelling together, did they hold 
themselves out as husband and wife? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And at home here, as far as you know, did they hold 
themselves out as husband and wife? 
A: I'm sure they did, yes. They did as far as we were 
concerned. 
Even further evidence is added on cross examination. 
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Q: (Walsh) Well, did you ever know Susan to go by the 
last name of Van Nood? 
As Oh, yes. When—when they were in San Francisco with 
us, she had done that at the hotel, or motel they were 
staying at. 
The one witness that was most familiar with how Ms. 
Gustaveson felt and held herself in a relationship was her 
ex-husband. William Gustaveson remained close to Susan even 
many years after their divorce. Subsequently, he also became 
a good friend to Mr. Van Nood. Being in an advantageous 
position to know, he was a well qualified witness with no axe 
to grind. His undisputed testimony carries significant 
weight because of this. (Transcript page 157). 
Q: And do Martin—did Martin and Susan hold themselves 
out to you to be husband and wife? 
As In every sense... 
The Court correctly applied these facts in reaching its 
conclusion that the parties had entered into a marriage 
contract. 
ARGUMENT SIX 
APPELLANT SORENSEN'S CONCLUSIONS 
ARE BASED ON SEVERAL MISAPPLIED 
STATEMENTS OF EVIDENCE ADDUCED 
AT TRIAL 
Several factual errors occur in Appellant Sorensen's 
brief which distort the facts and evidence as testified to in 
the lower Court. 
Sorensen states that the relationship between Mr. Van 
Nood and Ms. Gustaveson was "somewhat rocky as she moved in 
with him and then lived with someone else, and moved back in 
with Mr. Van Nood" (Apellant's Brief page 4). 
This is not the fact. 
The reference is taken out of context. Not only was the 
parties relationship smooth as dicussed on page 65 of the 
Transcript. 
Q: Was there any rift in your marital—(relationship)? 
A: None 
When the Apellant Sorensen talks about Susan having 
lived with someone else merely demonstrates how little they 
knew about her. The transcript clearly is about Julia Van 
Nood (Tso), Martin's daughter and not about Ms. Gustaveson. 
Julia lived with Martin and Susan for several years with only 
one brief exception. 
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There is no testimony in any portion of the transcript 
referring to a "rocky" relationship between the Decedent and 
the Appellee. In fact, the evidence is of a stable and happy 
relationship. 
The neighbor lady, Jet Kensington, testified to the 
parties being a loving couple that showed great affection and 
devotion to one another. She states on page 126 of the 
Transcript: 
Q: Can you describe anything you observed when you were 
outdoors at your home? 
As Well, I observed a very—I want to say committed, 
but in an unobtrusive way. They were very private. And 
tended to touch shoulders or communicate the way men and 
women will if they're close, and confident of each other. 
Appellant Sorensen argues, "Did the parties file their 
taxes consistent with a common law marriage, or did they file 
single returns and pay outrageously more tax, because they in 
fact did not hold themselves out as husband and wife" (Page 
10 of Apellant brief). 
There is no evidence as to the amount of income, assets, 
or expenses of either Mr. Van Nood nor Ms. Gustaveson, so 
there is no basis for assuming that Ms. Gustaveson, by 
exercising her marital right of filing an individual tax 
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return, was paying "outrageou ly more tax". 
On page 47 of Appellant brief, they again misinterpret 
the facts. Appellant Sorensen states: "Not only did 
essentially all who testified state that they had not 
acquired a "general reputation as husband and wife...". 
Is this a correct statement? No, it is not. 
The only witness that made anything close to statements 
like this was Sorensen, himself. His testimony, as it 
appears on page 34 of the Transcript, is as follows: 
Q: (Walsh) Did you—were you ever under the 
understanding that she (Susan) was married to Martin Van 
Nood? 
A: No. 
Q: Do you know anybody that had the belief that she 
was married to Martin Van Nood? 
A: No. 
Reviewing the one other witness (Janice Sorensen) who 
had a similar story to tell indicates that she had no contact 
with Ms. Gustaveson for at least three and a half years. 
Tom Sorensen did not have any contact with Ms. 
Gustaveson for at least the final six months of her life. In 
fact, even though he was her only living relative, and that 
they lived only seventeen blocks apart. (Transcript pages 
35). 
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Q: (Mr. Dalgliesh) Mr. Sorensen, in the last four years 
what would you estimate the number of conversations you 
had with your sister? 
A: Three of four. 
Qs So you weren't close at all? 
A: No. We'd just keep in touch. 
Qs Did she instigate any of the phone conversations? 
As No. She didn't. 
Q: Did she come to your home? 
A: No. 
Q: So, in—in four years, you've only had approximately 
four conversations with her? 
A: Off and on, yeah. 
Therefore, neither the Appellant Sorensen nor his wife 
would have any idea as to the marital reputation of Ms. 
Gustaveson and Mr. Van Nood at any time during the over six 
year relationship of the parties. 
The Court applied the correct interpretation to these 
facts in reaching its conclusion that the parties had entered 
into a marriage contract. 
ARGUMENT SEVEN 
THE UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE HAS PROVIDED 
NO LEGISLATIVE INTENT AS TO THE FACTS 
NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH THE COMMON LAW 
MARRIAGE RELATIONSHIP EXCEPT BY UTAH 
CODE ANN. 30-1-4.5 (1953 AS AMENDED), 
LEAVING THE PROOF TO ESTABLISH THE 
VALIDITY OF THE MARRIAGE TO THE TRIAL 
COURT USING THE SAME GENERAL RULES OF 
EVIDENCE AS FACTS IN OTHER CASES 
Appellant Sorensen states in his argument (Apellant 
brief page 5) that the Legislature required that the parties 
do what other married couples do, like borrow money, own 
assets jointly, and have common debts, etc. 
No where in the statute does it require the Court to 
find such specific facts to determine if a marriage contract 
exists. 
Sorensen further argues, "It is clear that what the 
State Legislature contemplates was that the parties share 
checking accounts, savings accounts, purchase items like 
cars, or real property - etc., together reflecting a 
relationship tomorrow, not just what is convenient today." 
(Appellant's brief page 7) 
This argument has no basis in fact. Appellee Van Nood 
has previously presented under "ARGUMENT SIX" that there were 
good and valid reasons for Mr. Van Nood and Ms. Gustaveson 
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not to conduct their affairs as indicated above. It is not 
required that one conduct one's financial affairs to meet 
some hypothetical intent of the Legislature to establish a 
marriage contract. Many solemnized married couples have no 
jointly owned assets, no bank accounts, no cars or real 
property...yet they are married. Why should it be otherwise 
with this couple? 
Susan Gustaveson's former husband testified that during 
their solemnized marriage, he and Susan always maintained 
separate credit and banking accounts. (Transcript page 153) 
ARGUMENT EIGHT 
APPELLEE VAN NOOD SHOULD BE AWARDED 
SINGLE OR DOUBLE HIS COSTS AND 
REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES AS PROVIDED 
BY UTAH Rules App. P. 33 (a) 
Appellant Sorensen has conceded that he is not 
challenging the Findings of Fact. Should he have done so, he 
would have had to demonstrate that despite the evidence, the 
trial Court's findings ar& so lacking in support as to be 
against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them 
clearly erroneous. IJT, res Estate of Bartel 1, 776 P.2d, 885, 
886 (Utah 1989). 
The trial Court heard evidence which supported a finding 
that each element of Utah Code Ann. 30-1-4,5 (1953 as 
amended) had been met by the Appellee Van Nood to validate 
the marriage between him and Susan Gustaveson. The Court was 
in the best position to determine the credibility of the 
witnesses and to weigh and assess any conflicts in the 
evidence. 
Since the arguments made by the Appellant Sorensen are 
that the Legislature intended more of different facts to 
support a conclusion that the marriage existed, and since 
Appellant Sorensen has not cited any Legislative intent or 
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statutory authority to support this contention, it appears 
that the appeal lacks legal and factual merit. The Court 
should award Appellee Van Nood double costs and attorney 
fees. Utah Rules App. P. 35(a), 
_r>o_ 
CONCLUSION 
To establish a common law marriage in Utah one must meet 
the specific requirements of Utah Code Ann. 30-1-4.5 (1953 as 
amended). Each element has been duly met by the Appellee Van 
Nood • 
The Appellate Courts have reviewed Utah Code Ann. 30-1-
4.5 (1953 as amended) in only four cases. None bear directly 
upon this case. See Mattes vs. Olearain« 759 P.2d 1177 
(Utah App. 1988), Barber vs. Barber. 792 P.2d 134, (Utah 
App. 1990), Walters vs. Walters, 812 P.2d 64 (Utah App. 
1991) and Van Per Stappen vs. Van Per Stappen, 815 P.2d 1335 
(Utah App. 1991). 
In this case the Appellee Martin Van Nood has by a 
preponderance of evidence met the five criteria of the 
statute. Martin Van Nood and Susan Gustaveson lived together 
as man and wife for four and one-half years (June, 1988 to 
October, 1992). Utah's common law statute was in existence 
during the entire period. Their life together was only 
terminated by Ms. Gustaveson's untimely death. They shared 
and maintained a home the themselves and for much of the time 
for Mr. Van Nood's minor child. They jointly provided for 
their own support and for the child's support. They held 
themselves out and acquired a uniform and general reputation 
as husband and wife, as was testified to by neighbors, 
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business employers and by friends and associates of both 
parties- The decedent's former father-in-law, the now adult 
child of the couple, and others. 
They traveled and socialized as husband and wife. They 
received mail as husband and wife. They performed normal 
household duties as husband and wife. They gave and recieved 
gifts as husband and wife. 
Susan Gustaveson and Martin Van Nood fully understood 
that they had not undergone a formal marriage ceremony. It 
is probable that they were not even aware of the common law 
marriage statute that the State of Utah recently adopted. 
Yet they conducted their affairs, their family and social 
lives and their marital relationship in such a way that 
clearly demonstrates they considered themselves to have 
entered into a committed contract of marriage. 
Ms. Gustaveson used the name Van Nood on occasion. This 
is not an indication of lacl* of a marriage contract. She 
owned bank accounts and real property, and held credit cards, 
all in her former married name. Likewise, Mr. Van Nood held 
his own credit and other assets as Martin Van Nood only. All 
of these items they owned prior to their relationship 
having commenced. 
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Susan Gustaveson's credit was good. Martin Van Nood's 
was not so good. It is consistent with her duty as a spouse 
to keep some good credit for the family and not create 
potential problems by changing the name on these accounts and 
on her real property. Conversely, Mr. Van Nood would not 
jeopardize Susan's credit standing by combining credit 
accounts. It is a fact that many professional married women, 
whose marriages are solemnized maintain a surname different 
than that of their spouse. 
The fact that Ms. Gustaveson did not list herself as 
married on government documents is not dispositive in this 
case. It is only one fact to be considered. She knew she 
did not have a solemnized marriage, and in all honesty felt 
that this was the only proper answer on government and 
business forms. These documents do not ask, "Have you 
entered into a contract of common law marriage?", or "Are you 
a common law wife?", or even "Has your marriage been proved 
by a Court of Administrative agency of the State of Utah?". 
The parties clearly had a marriage contract. They were 
committed, had exchanged a token pledge of marriage, treated 
the minor child as mother and father, and her child as 
grandmother and grandfather; and had even committed 
themselves to solemnization of their marriage contract. The 
couple were mature adults, fully committed to each other and 
to the rights, duties and obligations of a marriage 
relationship. And for four and one-half years fulfilled that 
marriage contract. 
The lower Court's application of the facts in 
reaching its conclusion of law that the parties had a 
marriage contract is correct. Judge Moffat's reasoning 
appears in the Transcript at pages 163-8. (See addendum 3) 
Appellee Martin Van Nood respectfully requests that the 
ruling by the Honorable Richard Moffat of the lower Court be 
upheld holding that Mr. Van Nood and Ms. Gustaveson were 
lawfully married at the date of death of Susan Gustaveson. 
^^J_^^^^_ 
WILLIAM J.M. DALGLIESH 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered two (2) 
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE 
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Suite 270, Salt Lake City, Utah 84109, this ^ day of 
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WILLIAM J.M. DALGLIESH 
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L189 HUSBAND AND WIFE 30-1 
(6) between persons of the same sex. 1991 
0-1-2.1. Validation of marriage to a person 
subject to chronic epileptic fits w h o 
had not been sterilized. 
All marriages, otherwise valid and legal, con-
tracted prior to the effective date of this act, to which 
either party was subject to chronic epileptic fits and 
who had not been sterilized, as provided by law, are 
hereby validated and legalized in all respects as 
though such marriages had been duly and legally 
contracted in the first instance. 1963 
30-1-2.2. Validation of interracial marriages. 
All marriages, otherwise valid and legal, con-
tracted prior to the effective date of this act, to which 
one of the parties of the marriage was subject to dis-
ability to marry on account of Section 30-1-2(5), (6), 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 [prior to amendment by 
Chapters 42 and 43, Laws 1963], are hereby valid and 
made lawful in all respects as though such marriages 
had been duly and legally contracted in the first in-
stance. 1965 
30-1-3. Marriage in belief of death or divorce of 
former spouse — Issue legitimate. 
When a marriage is contracted in good faith and in 
the belief of the parties that a former husband or 
wife, then living and not legally divorced, is dead or 
legally divorced, the issue of such marriage born or 
begotten before notice of the mistake shall be the le-
gitimate issue of both parties. 1953 
30-1-4. Validity of foreign marriages. 
Marriages solemnized in any other country, state 
or territory, ifvalid where solemnized, are valid here. 
1953 
30-1-4.5. Validity of marriage not so lemnized. 
( D A marr iage which is not solemnized according 
to this chapter shall be legal and valid if a court or 
adminis t ra t ive order establishes tha t it arises out of a 
contract between two consenting part ies who: 
(a) are capable of giving consent; 
(b) are legally capable of entering a solem-
nized marriage under the provisions of this chap-
ter; 
(c) have cohabited; 
(d) mutual ly assume mari ta l r ights , duties, 
and obligations; and 
(e) who hold themselves out as and have ac-
quired a uniform and general reputat ion as hus-
band and wife. 
(2) The determination or establishment of a mar-
riage under this section must occur dur ing the rela-
tionship described in Subsection (1), or within one 
year following the termination of tha t relationship. 
Evidence of a marr iage recognizable under this sec-
tion may be manifested in any form, and may be 
proved under the same general rules of evidence as 
facts in other cases. 1987 
30-1-5. Marriage solemnization — Before unau-
thorized person — Validity. 
No marr iage solemnized before any person profess-
ing to have authori ty therefor shall be invalid for 
want of such authori ty, if consummated in the belief 
of the par t ies or ei ther of them tha t he had such au-
thority and t h a t they have been lawfully married. 
1953 
30-1-6. Who may solemnize marriages — Certifi-
cate. 
(a) ministers , rabbis, or priests of any religio 
denomination in regular communion with a: 
religious society, who are 18 years of age or old* 
(b) the governor, mayors of municipalities, 
just ice, judge, or commissioner of a court 
record or a judge of a court not of record of tl 
s ta te of Utah; 
(c) judges or magis t ra tes of the United State 
and 
(d) the county clerk of any county in the s ta t 
if the clerk chooses to solemnize marriages. 
(2) A judge or magis t ra te who holds office in Uta 
may solemnize marr iages when retired, under rule 
set by the Supreme Court. 
(3) A certificate of marr iage shall be given to th 
couple and shall show the name of the county fror 
which the license is issued and date of its issuance 
(4) In th is section, "judge or magistrate of t h 
United Sta tes" means a justice of the United State; 
Supreme Court, a judge of a court of appeals, a dis 
trict court, or any court created by an act of Congres* 
the judges of which are entit led to hold office during 
good behavior, a judge of a bankruptcy court or a t a i 
court, or a United Sta tes magis t ra te . 1983 
30-1-7. Marriage l i censes . 
No mar r iage may be solemnized without a license 
issued by the county clerk of any county of the s ta te 
of U t a h not more t h a n 30 days prior to the date of 
solemnization of the marr iage . 1987 
30-1-8. Appl icat ion for l icense — Contents . 
(1) A marr iage license may be issued by the county 
clerk only after an application has been filed in his 
office, requir ing the following information: 
(a) the full names of the parties, including the 
maiden name of the female; 
(b) the current address of each party; 
(c) the date and place of bir th (town or city, 
county, s ta te or country, if possible); 
(d) the names of their respective parents , in-
cluding the maiden name of the mother; 
(e) t he birthplaces of fathers and mothers 
(town or city, county, s ta te or country, if possi-
ble); and 
(f) the distinctive race or nationality of each of 
the parents. 
(2) If t he female is a widow, her maiden name shall 
be shown in brackets. 
(3) If one or both of the parties is under 16 years of 
age, the clerk shall provide them with a standard 
petition on a form approved by the Judicial Council to 
be presented to the juvenile court to obtain the autho-
rization required by Section 30-1-9. 1992 
30-1-9. Marriage by minors — Consent of par-
ent or guardian — Juvenile court au-
thorization. 
(1) If at the time of applying for a license the maie 
or the female is under 18 years of age, and not before 
married, a license may not be issued without: 
(a) the consent of his or her father, mother, or 
guard ian personally given or certified in wri t ing 
to the clerk over his or her s ignature; and 
(b) if under 16 years of age, the writ ten autho-
rization to mar ry from a judge of the court exer-
cising juveni le jurisdiction in the county where 
e i ther par tv to thp mow*-™ -—:J- np" 
Rule 32 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in State v. Erickson, 148 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 45 (Ct. App. 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — The Utah Court of Appeals, 
1988 Utah L. Rev. 150. 
Rule 32. Interest on judgment. 
Unless otherwise provided by law, if a judgment for money in a civil case is 
affirmed, whatever interest is allowed by law shall be payable from the date 
the judgment was entered in the trial court. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and Running of interest on judgment where both 
Error § 941. parties appeal, 11 A.L.R.4th 1099. 
C.J.S. — 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1979. Retrospective application and effect of state 
A.L.R. — Date from which interest on judg- statute or rule allowing interest or changing 
ment starts running, as affected by modifica- rate of interest on judgments or verdicts, 41 
tion of amount of judgment on appeal, 4 A.L.R.4th 694. 
A.L.R.3d 1221. Key Numbers. — Interest «• 39(2). 
Right to interest pending appeal, 15 
A.L.R.3d 411. 
Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery 
of attorney's fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of 
right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal 
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just 
damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, 
and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order 
that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, 
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by 
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or 
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for 
the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to 
harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will 
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
(c) Procedures. 
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its 
own motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of 
the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of 
the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other 
paper. 
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court 
shall issue to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show 
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that has been presented was that these peoole did feel that 
Martin and Susan were a married couple. 
THE COURT: Well, I've got to say that 
30-1-4.5 is not a model of clarity as far as how you 
5 establish this relationship or it—how you establish the 
result of a relationship. But let's — let's talk about it just 
a minute. 
8 I A, there's no doubt about the fact that they were 
9 both capable of giving consent, and there's no doubt about B, 
they were legally—each were legally capable of entering into 
a solemnized marriage under the provisions of this statute, 
if they wanted to, this chapter. And C, there's no doubt that 
there was no cohabitation. 
So, as the parties hereto have been working on and 
as Mr. Walsh has pointed out, the questions are the provisions 
of D and E, Sub D and Sub E. Well, let's talk about what 
yj mutually assumed marital rights, duties and obligations means. 
Now, I recognize that both of these interrelate, the same 
act or series of acts or the same event can have a — a meaning 
for both of these two subsections. 
As a matter of fact, even C, in and of itself has 
some bearing, to my way of thinking upon D and E. Cohabita-
tion, I don't take to be a one or a two-night relationship 
between parties, maybe not even a two or three-week relation-
ship between parties where a man and woman live together and 
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3 
engage in sexual relationships and even do all the things 
that people do; but when that goes on for a long period of 
time, then that cohabitation takes on a--a period—or a sense 
4 I of permanency. 
I don't agree with what has obviously been the 
6 I thrust by—by the applicant here, that is by Mr. Sorensen 
rj that the question of marital rights and duties and obligations 
means that the parties run out and sign on each other's notes, 
or that the parties, upon entering into a relationship where 
they move into somebody's home, immediately the party who 
moved in goes down and signs on the utilities and those kinds 
of things. That can be dene, and if it were done, I think 
it becomes evidence of the assumption of marital rights, 
duties and obligations. But I think there are other things 
which make those assumptions—those—yeah, those assumptions 
equally obvious. 
The parties here shared money. Martin gave Susan 
cash. She made certain payments, he made certain payments. 
They lived together by reason of those payments being made, 
whether it was for gas and oil on the one hand and water and 
power on the other hand, or whatever it might have been. They 
assumed marital rights, duties and obligations in that for a 
period o f — o f — a long period of time, they shared the same 
household, they cooked the meals together, they—somebody 
made the—the beds, and somebody took out the garbage, and 
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there's even testimony that Martin did—did that. 
I don't perceive D to require the same formality 
of assumption of marital rights, duties and obligations that 
Mr. Walsh has — has —has argued for. And I think that's where 
our difference arises in this case. 
I feel the same way about E. The question has 
been asked by Mr. Walsh over and over again, did they ever 
tell you that they were married, did they ever say that they 
were married? Well, to acquire a general and uniform 
reputation as husband and wife, I don't think requires that 
they necessarily have the reputation for having been married. 
It is that they act and behave as husbands and wives behave. 
The fact that there isn't that little piece of paper that is 
signed by a judge or a—other official, authorized to 
solemnize marriages has any bearing on it. Itls how do they 
appear to the public? 
And the fact that some of that public, some of that 
group of friends, that general number of people that we all 
know, knows they're not married doesn't change the fact of 
their behavior, doesn't change the fact of how they are 
regarded in the minds of those that know them and know them 
intimately. 
It seems to me that the testimony here is just 
overwhelming that this couple lived together, that they did 
assume these mutual rights and duties and they did hold 
165 
ALAN P. SMITH, CSR 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801)266-0320 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84107 
themselves out as having that relationship. And I think when 
you take the testimony of Susan's first husband, which was 
I the testimony here today that was not in any way controverted 
about why and how they—she didn!t want to marry—at least 
didn't want to enter into a formal marriage relationship, 
that doesn't change the fact that they held themselves out as 
- I husband and wife, and the thing that this statute requires 
isn't that they hold themselves out as married, is that they 
acquire a uniform and general reputation as husband and wife. 
And I think a reputation as a husband and wife is a different 
thing from saying, Yes, we're married. I don't think that's 
required. 
And another thing that I think has to be carried— 
has to be borne in mind here, we can talk about these forms 
until we're blue in the face, but the fact of the matter is 
that there's not a word of testimony before this Court/ and 
I would be willing to bet you, that had anybody asked, the 
answer would have been: We didn't even know this statute 
existed and if we did, we had no idea of—of how it worked or 
what it would do to our relationship. 
They couldn't, I don't think, without having had 
that knowledge, have said in all honesty, Yes, we're married. 
Because in their own minds, in terms of the legal term 
"marriage", a. solemnized marriage, they obviously weren't. 
So, when somebody who's honest, and I think that we 
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all are, as much as we possibly can be; I know how I would 
feel if I went down to the--to the—or filed my tax returns 
under the circumstances and—and I was not legally married 
and didn't realize this statute very likely could put me in 
the position of being legally married, I would probably file 
single; but--but I don't think that that's any kind of a—of 
a change of holding themselves out. That's done because under 
the particular circumstance of those kinds of things, the— 
you have to fit into a block, you have to fit into a category 
that's been provided by the particular agency involved. 
Now, the one place—and I will admit this—where 
that—that doesn't hold entirely true is the one where she 
marked that—not live-in, either. And I—I don't understand 
that one entirely, other than it may have a general—or it 
may have some genesis in the general attitude I've just 
expressed. But even with that, I think the testimony here as 
to—as to the relationship of this couple and what they have 
done in the public and the way they have behaved between 
themselves in their relationships with other persons, given 
the testimony of the former husband, who hasn't got a thing 
to gain by this, the testimony of the former father-in-law, 
who almost—I guess I'll say it, the relationship of a 
father to this—to this girl, and so on, I just can'.t—I 
can't come to any conclusion other than that the terms and 
the conditions of the statute have been met and that the 
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243 EAST FOURTH SOUTH #30 3 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE: C801L 532-6536 
ATTORNEY FOR 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
SUSAN RANAE SORENSEN GUSTAVESON: 
Case No.925901280 ES 
Deceased. : 
Judge: Richard Moffat 
This natter came en regularly for trial on the 25th day of March, 1993, 
before the Honorable Ridaard Mbffatt, one of the judges of the above-entitled 
Court. Petitioner, Qrin T. Sorensen appeared in person and with Counsel, 
John Walsh.. Respondeat, Martin Van Nood appeared in person and with 
Counsel, William J. M. Dalgliesh. The matter at issue was an objection 
filed by Martin Van Nood to the appointment of Qrin T. Sorensen as the 
personal representative of the Estate of Susan Ranae Sorensen Gustaveson, 
on the basis that Mr. Van Nood has priority of appointment as the 
comrrui law husband of the decedent, over that of Mr. Sorensen, the 
brother of .the decedent. The trial was held to declare that Mr. Van Nood 
was the husband of the decedent, under the provisions of §30-1-4.5, 
Utah Code Annotated, (1953) as amended; and that the marriage was legal 
and valid. 
Hie Court, having heard the testimony of the petitioner, 
respondent and numerous other witnesses, and having considered the 
evidence, including the exhibits submitted by the parties, and being 
fully advised in the premises, new makes, adopts and ifles its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Respondent, Martin Van Nood, and the decedent, Susan 
Gustaveson lived together on a constant basis, as husband and wife, 
from June, 1988 until the death of Susan Gustaveson on October 19, 
1992. 
2. Respondent and the decedent first lived together in the 
heme of the respondent, and then moved to the home of the decedent in 
May, 1991, where they resided until Susan Gustaveson's death. 
3. At the time the respondent and the decedent conmenced 
residing together, the respondent was 41 years of age, and the 
decedent was 36 years of age, both of legal age to contract a marriage. 
4. Both the respondent and the decedent were divorced frcm 
other persons at the time they commenced their marriage relationship 
with each, other. Respondent's divorce frcm his first spouse was final on 
Octcber 1, 1982, and the decedent's divorce from her first spouse 
was final on February/ 22, 1982. 
5. This action was brought within one year follcwing the 
termination of the relationship of the respondent and the decedent, 
said termination caused by the death of Susan Gustaveson. 
6. That the respondent and the decedent cohabited for a 
period of approxinately four and one half years; and had sexual 
relations with each other during that time. 
7. That the respondent and the decedent mutually assumed 
maritial rights, duties, and obligations during their relationship, 
in that they did the following acts together: 
a. They engaged in a sexual relationship. 
b. They maintained.'their hone together for themselves 
for four and one half years; and they raised the minor daughter of 
the respondent together for threeyears, until she married and moved 
from the family home. The decedent treated respondent's daughter 
as her cwn daughter, .and considered respondent's grandchild as her 
own grandchild. 
c. Each contributed financial support to the household, 
expenses; and they purchased furniture and hone inprovements for 
themselves. 
d. They received mail together. 
e. They exchanged gifts with each other and family 
members; and received gifts from family members. 
f. They shared in the normal household duties of 
a married couple: cooking, cleaning, hate repairs, care of a child, 
travel, entertainment both in the heme and attendance of social 
activities, outside of the heme with friends. and co-workers. 
g. The decedent contributed financial support to 
the respondents business by purchasing the business a conputer. 
h. They shared activities as husband and wife with 
respondent^ child, such as camping, attendance as "parents" at 
the childfs high school graduation, marriage, and birth of her 
child. 
8. The respondent and the decedent held themselves out and acquired 
a uniform and general reputation as husband and wife.in the following 
manner: 
a. Neighbors considered them to be husband and wife. 
b. Fellas co-workers and the employer of the decedent 
and the former husband of the decedent and his parents regarded them 
as husband and wife. 
c« Travel arrangements were made as husband and wife. 
d. They shopped together as husband and wife for household 
wares., and for a new hone. 
e. They held themselves out as husband and wife to their 
friends, relatives, and general public. 
£. That the parties made an oral contract of marriage 
between themselves. 
10. . That each was capable of giving consent to a marriage 
between themselves. 
If la t the marriage of the respondent and the decedent 
was not solemnized. 
Vrr.r the resDcncp*'^ nri M"*.e flpredent were each, legally 
capable oz anr^r—^ JL*:LV_ W* solemnized marriage 'under the provisions 
of Title 30, Utah, Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
• ~'-- r rsen is the brother "',1 i-he decedent, 
fiuii the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court new malsi s , 
adopts and files Its: 
i 'i 'flOiJSlONb UF LAW 
uruscjLction in this matter. 
i respondent, and the decedent entered .into a marriage, 
which, was. not solenhize*"' nil marriage. 
^
 m
 . each,, was ...capable., of giving consent to a solemnized 
marriage 
ao; .-. •. -L.. altering a solemnized 
marriage u:aei TT:** provisions of Title 30, Utah Cede Annotated, 1953, 
as amended. 
! . he parties cohabited. 
each mutually assumed 'marital rights, duties, and 
obligations. 
7. Ilia, t "'the respondent and the decedent held themselves 
out as and have acquired a 'uniform and general reputation as husband 
"Hut .in '"YdfM"" ,.iiLd Juduiient should be entered, declaring 
that .Martin Vai i Nood and Susan .'Ranae Sorensen Gustaveson 'where 
validly .married at 'the time and date of ttv d^ath >>f Sir~.i. I'HI W 
Sor^->*- ... 
J: '•his matter should be referred back ~o *-*\^ 
probate calendr.*' "or determs* : : - persona... 
rep^^i. ,;...„ „ L ^ Estate of Susan Ranae Sorensen Gustaveson, 
based 'upon, 'the Order and Judgment to 'be entered herein. 
D a t e d TI • •. i * _ • . 
